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The early modern era witnessed the formation across Europe of centralized states 
that captured increasing shares of resources as taxes. Those states that were able to 
establish and implement a more efficient and centralized system of taxation not only 
benefited from greater capacity to deal with domestic challenges, they also enjoyed 
greater military success in the international arena. They were also able to shield their 
economies better from the large fiscal shocks created by the wars by limiting borrowing 
and avoiding fiscally motivated currency debasements. Not all states achieved fiscal 
centralization, however, and among those that did, its timing and extent varied 
significantly. As a result, there emerged, by the second half of the eighteenth century, 
glaring differences between the fiscal and military capacities of states that were able to 
collect more revenue and those that could not.
 1 
The centralization of revenue collection as a fiscal phenomenon and in the broader 
context of state consolidation has been investigated primarily with evidence from 
European states.
 In this paper, we examine the same process with evidence from the 
finances of the Ottoman state, which was at once part of the European state system but 
which also inherited institutional elements from the Middle Eastern and Central Asian 
traditions. Specifically, we examine the Ottoman central administration’s tax revenue 
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series for the 16
th -19
th centuries, review the fiscal and military institutions, and discuss 
the relationship between fiscal performance, institutional changes and economic 
development. 
To investigate the Ottoman fiscal performance over time and in the context of 
other major European states, we make use of annual cash revenue series of the central 
treasury measured in tons of silver based on the “ex-post” budgets from the early 16
th 
century until World War I.
2. The key pattern that emerges from these series is low and 
fluctuating central revenues without an upward trend in the early modern centuries 
followed by rapid gains in the 19
th century. Ottoman central revenues were only 
marginally higher in the 1780s in comparison to the 1560s. In contrast, they increased by 
more than 15 fold between the 1780s and World War I. We also construct estimates of 
per capita tax revenues in grams of silver and adjust for changes in prices and incomes. 
The basic pattern that Ottoman administration achieved enduring fiscal gains only in the 
19
th century remains robust when these alternative measures of central fiscal capacity are 
used. 
We also compare annual Ottoman central revenues with those of England, France, 
the Dutch Republic, Spain, Venice, Austrian Monarchy, Prussia, Poland and Russia. 
Revenue series for these polities point to earlier gains in centralized fiscal capacity than 
the Ottomans, dating back to 16
th and 17
th centuries for Western Europe and 18
th century 
for Central and Eastern Europe. By the 18
th century, especially the second half of that 
century, a large gap had emerged between the per capita and total revenues of most 
European states and those of the Ottomans. As most of these revenues were spent on 
warfare, this growing fiscal gap was accompanied by a sharp deterioration in Ottoman 
military performance against its European neighbors, the Austrian Monarchy and Russia. 
On the other side of the same coin, one might argue that the sharp fiscal gains of the 19
th 
century contributed to the survival of the Ottoman Empire until World War I.  
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There were many reasons for the low levels of revenues and fiscal centralization 
of the Ottomans during the early modern era. Difficult terrain, vast distances to the 
capital and low urbanization rates made tax collection much more difficult in comparison 
to the smaller and more urbanized western European polities. Another possible 
explanation for the differences in per capita taxes is the differences and changes in per 
capita income levels. Higher levels of per capita income made it easier to collect more 
taxes, not only in absolute terms, but also as a percentage of per capita income. However, 
per capita income differences between the Ottomans and European countries remained 
limited until the nineteenth century, with the exceptions of Britain and the Dutch 
Republic. Secondly, most European countries were able to achieve significant increases 
in per capita tax revenues with little or no increase in per capita income during the early 
modern era.
3 In other words, per capita tax revenues increased not so much because per 
capita incomes increased, but more importantly because administrations achieved the 
capacity to extract and collect at the center greater shares of a polity’s income as taxes. 
The growing extractive capacity of central administrations, in turn, relates to 
intra-state politics and the relationship between administrations and other stakeholders in 
taxation. Early modern states could not employ bureaucracies that functioned based on 
written regulations, evaluated on merit and enumerated with fixed wages.
4 Instead, in 
assessing, collecting and spending taxes, administrations relied on a range of 
functionaries, officials, corporations, councils, assemblies and tax farmers. These 
intermediaries also took part in the military apparatus and were often major wealth 
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holders in the polity. Due to their role in fiscal and military apparatus, the intermediaries 
influenced the size and incidence of the tax burden and captured a significant portion of 
tax revenue at the cost of the central treasury through temporary assignments, long term 
alienation or embezzlement.
5 Accordingly, there was a close relationship between levels 
of central revenue and the changes in the terms of intermediation. 
There is an extensive body of literature that identifies the introduction of credible 
constraints on executive authority as the critical juncture in domestic politics and fiscal 
consolidation. This argument holds that representative regimes were able to apply taxes 
to broader sections of the economy and collect more taxes because the representative 
bodies helped negotiate and sanction fiscal demands in return for limits on the power of 
the monarch on the use of funds, especially during periods of fiscal crises. It has also 
been argued in this context that the power of the so-called absolutist states was not 
absolute at all. These regimes retained the control of expenditures but struggled to collect 
taxes without such deals with local elites who controlled large segments of the economy 
and were able to limit the administration’s access to funds.
 6   
In contrast, the literature on military revolution and fiscal military states 
emphasizes the role of changes in military technology and related organizational 
innovations in driving fiscal and coercive centralization.
7 While the relative importance 
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and exact sequencing of the innovations is a matter of dispute, this literature has argued 
that improvements in firearms and artillery technologies as well as gains in discipline, 
drill, and tactical capacity of troops favored centralization of military force and led to 
massive expansion of centrally administrated and provisioned infantry units at the 
expense of decentralized production of cavalry. The monopolization of military force was 
delayed in Eastern Europe because until the modern era, cavalry was the only effective 
defense against recurring attacks of horse riding archers of the Central Asian steppe.
8 The 
rise of central armies and the centralization of finances were closely intervened because 
centrally administrated troops consumed the bulk of the tax revenues and in turn proved 
instrumental in eliminating domestic fiscal and judicial fragmentation. 
     For six centuries until World War I, the Ottoman Empire stood at the 
crossroads of intercontinental trade, stretching from the Balkans and the Black 
Sea region through Anatolia, Syria, Mesopotamia and the Gulf to Egypt and most 
of the North African coast. The economic institutions and policies of this 
agrarian empire were shaped to a large degree by the priorities and interests of a 
central administration. Until recently, Ottoman historiography had depicted an empire 
in decline after the sixteenth century. In contrast, a growing body of literature has been 
arguing that the Ottoman state and society showed considerable ability to reorganize 
as a way of adapting to changing circumstances in Eurasia in the early modern era, 
well before the nineteenth century reforms known as Tanzimat or “re-ordering”.
9 While 
pragmatism, flexibility and selective institutional change were traits that enabled the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Military States, 1500–1660, Routledge, London-New York, 2002 and Richard Bean, 
“War and the birth of the nation-state”, this Journal, 33, 1973, 203-21.   
8 K. Chase, Firearms: A Global History to 1700. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003; A. Gat. War in Human Civilization. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2006 and G. Parker. The Military Revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the 
West, 1500-1800. 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1996. 
9 For recent studies emphasizing the pragmatism and flexibility of Ottomans as well as 
selective institutional change, see G. Agoston,“A Flexible Empire, Authority and Its 
Limits on the Ottoman Frontiers”, International Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 9, 15-31; 
K. Barkey, Empire of Difference, Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2008 and Ş. Pamuk,“Institutional Change 
and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800”, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, Vol. 35, 2004, 225-47.   5
Ottomans to retain power until the modern era, limitations of these traits need to be 
equally emphasized. Institutional change did not apply equally to all areas of Ottoman 
economic life. Not all types of institutions were affected to the same degree by these 
changes. Equally important, pragmatism, flexibility and selective institutional change by 
the central bureaucracy were often not sufficient for reaching its objectives, as we will 
discuss below.  
         In Ottoman historiography state finances and intra-state politics have been studied 
primarily through a periodization based on centralization and decentralization. The 
sixteenth century is generally regarded as the period when the power of the central 
administration was at its peak. In this period the fiscal apparatus distinguished between 
revenue sources allocated to the central treasury for provisioning of the standing army 
and particularly the elite infantry (janissaries), on the one hand, and the sources allocated 
to prebendal timar system for the upkeep of provincial cavalry, on the other. In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the growing demands of warfare and particularly 
the need to provision an increasing number of infantry units induced the administration to 
adopt a series of ad hoc fiscal innovations to increase the cash revenues of the central 
treasury. This period is characterized as politically decentralized because of the rise of 
urban notables in the provinces who served as tax intermediaries and also formed their 
own armed retinues. The notables mobilized the troops in support of administration’s 
military endeavors but occasionally came into violent conflict with the administration and 
rival notables. Ottoman central revenues remained low during the early modern 
centuries not because of low tax rates or inability to collect taxes but because a 
large part, more than half according to most observers, of the gross tax receipts 
were retained by various intermediaries, most importantly these urban elites in 
the provinces. Fiscal innovations by the central administration during this period were 
not effective due to the lack of a permanent and stable intermediation relationship 
between the administration and the notables and the failure to monopolize the armed 
forces. When taxes and various forms of domestic borrowing were not sufficient to meet 
the demands of war, the government made use of currency debasements to generate 
additional revenues.      6
 Growing fiscal and military disparities against the European states to the west 
and north placed enormous pressures on the Ottoman state, its finances and the economy 
especially during the second half of the eighteenth century. As military defeats began to 
cast doubt on the ability of the Ottoman state to survive, the central administration 
supported by some elites embarked on a major drive of military reform during the reign 
of Selim III (1789-1807). The movement gained momentum after the abolition of the 
janissaries in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and the Ottoman state was able 
to bring about significant fiscal centralization and large increases in revenues until World 
War I. 
 In the Ottoman centralization, representative institutions played a limited role. An 
Ottoman parliament was not established until after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, 
with the exception of a brief interlude in 1876-77.  The timing of institutional changes 
and the revenue series suggest, instead, that Ottoman fiscal consolidation was achieved 
primarily through the adoption of modern military techniques and modes of 
administrative organization and other new technologies such as railroads to reduce the 
large shares of the intermediaries in the tax collection process.  
       We begin below with an overview of the evolution of Ottoman fiscal 
institutions until 1780. We will then analyze the revenues of Ottoman central 
administrations and compare them with those of other European states in the early 
modern era. We will also discuss Ottoman centralization and examine the rise in Ottoman 
central revenues during the 19th century and briefly compare that with trends across 
Europe before we summarize our conclusions.  
 
Wars, Fiscal Pressures and the Evolution of Ottoman Fiscal Institutions  
     Through the early modern period a key distinction for Ottoman revenue sources were 
between those allocated to the accounts of the central treasury (Hazine-i Amare) and 
those allocated to provincial functionaries through the prebendal tımar system.
10 The 
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revenue sources to central treasury were ordinary and extraordinary monetary taxes 
collected through a range of mechanisms. Mukataa or tax-farming system was 
employed for the collection of monetary taxes in the urban areas including custom 
dues and commercial taxes, income from monopolies such as mints, saltworks and mines 
and agricultural dues from certain regions. Avariz were extraordinary war taxes on 
households collected in kind and increasingly in cash by apportioning the demands of the 
state amongst tax payers at the local level.
11  Cizye was a monetary head tax payable by 
non-muslim subjects of the Empire. It was directly administered by the central 
administration, based on surveys specifically kept for the purpose, but the administration 
also resorted to lump sum bargains at a discount with local religious leaders. These 
revenues to the central treasury were primarily spent on administrative expenses and on 
the provisioning and pay of the central standing army. 
       The revenue sources allocated to the prebendal timar system were primarily 
rural and agricultural dues.
12  Since Ottoman lands and population was 
considered the Sultan’s patrimony 
13, the peasants were due to pay land rent, 
taxes, labor dues and other fees designated in kind and in cash 
14. Provincial 
functionaries of the state, sipahis, collected these dues and spent to equip and 
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prepare a designated number of cavalrymen for military campaigns and other 
administrative tasks. This practice of linking cavalrymen to rural sources of 
revenue was not peculiar to the Ottomans and had its precedents in iqta system of 
the Seljuks and pronia system of the Byzantines. Its usefulness lay in discarding 
the need to circulate resources through the whole fiscal complex in an era with limited 
monetization and the ease of replication after territorial conquests.
15 In addition to these 
regular taxes, the Ottoman government made use of extraordinary taxes on households 
called avariz which were levied irregularly in times of war and collected in kind and 
increasingly in cash by apportioning the demands of the state amongst tax payers at the 
local level. The avariz which became increasingly more regular during the seventeenth 
century was quite similar to taille personelle in Ancien Regime France.
16   
     Since a large part of the tax revenues were spent for military purposes, Ottoman state 
finances came under heavy pressure during periods of war. These periods of fiscal duress 
were often the key periods when the Ottomans changed or modified their fiscal 
institutions or adopted entirely new institutions for tax collection, domestic borrowing or 
new revenue. The historical literature identifies two major periods for Ottoman state 
finances during the early modern centuries. The first was the long period of centralization 
that began in the middle of the fifteenth century and lasted until the end of the sixteenth 
century when the central administration’s share in total tax revenues tended to increase. 
The second period began around the turn of the seventeenth century and lasted until the 
end of the eighteenth century. As the power of the central administration declined, 
various groups, especially the notables in the provinces began to control an increasing 
share of the tax revenues at the expense of the central administration.   
     One key period in the development of Ottoman state finances was the reign of 
Mehmed II (1444 and 1451 to 1481) who successfully built up an emerging state 
dependent upon the goodwill and manpower of the rural aristocracy into an 
expanding empire with a large army and specialized central institutions. A 
number of harsh measures were used during this process. In addition to higher 
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taxes, state monopolies were established in such basic commodities as salt, soap 
and candle wax. Land and other properties in the hands of private owners or 
pious foundations were confiscated. As a result, the central administration began 
to control a larger share of the resources and revenues at the expense of the 
provinces. The treasury also benefited from the territorial conquests of the period 
and the extraction of one-time or annual tributes from vassal states.  
     The reign of Mehmed II was also a period of frequent and fiscally motivated 
currency debasements. The silver content of the akçe had changed very little 
from the 1320s until the 1440s. During the next four decades, however, its silver 
content was reduced by a total of 30 percent through debasements undertaken 
roughly every ten years.
17 These harsh fiscal measures and strong doses of 
interventionism encountered strong discontent. Nonetheless, Mehmed II 
continued with these policies until the end of his reign through a combination of 
increased power at the center and the success of his military campaigns which 
provided considerable gains to many of the groups involved. After his death, his 
son Bayezid II was forced to seek reconciliation with those groups that his father 
alienated during his long and forceful reign. In addition, he ended the policy of 
periodic debasements. During the following century, state finances remained 
strong thanks to the revenues obtained through rapid territorial expansion. 
Nonetheless, there are examples of short-term borrowing by the state during the 
sixteenth century. These services usually earned the financiers, mostly Jews and 
Greeks, the inside track for the most lucrative tax-farming contracts.
18 
    The Ottoman cavalry began to lose their effectiveness in the second half of the 
sixteenth century in the wars against the Habsburgs who brought large numbers 
of infantry with firearms to the battlefield. As the Ottomans recognized the need 
to maintain larger permanent armies at the expense of the cavalry from the 
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provinces, pressures increased for higher revenues at the center. The timar 
system soon began to be abandoned in favor of tax-farming arrangements in 
which individuals possessing liquid capital assets made cash payments to the 
central administration in return for the right to farm the taxes of a given region 
or fiscal unit for a fixed period, typically for one year.
19  
    Further deterioration of state finances during the seventeenth century 
increased the dependence of the central administration on the tax-farming system 
for the purposes of domestic borrowing. Duration of the tax-farming contracts 
was increased to three years or even longer. The central administration also 
began to demand an increasingly higher fraction of the auction price of the 
contract in advance.
20 Methods of collection of the irregular avariz taxes also went 
through a process of decentralization during the seventeenth century. The central 
administration increasingly turned to local notables with first hand knowledge of local 
conditions and local influence in both the imposition and collection of these taxes. 
21 
     The central administration’s pragmatic yet ad hoc responses to fiscal demands and 
emergencies created by the wars led to the formation of a new stratum of local notables 
(ayan) with local knowledge and ties in the later decades of the seventeenth century and 
during the eighteenth century. These families rose from the ranks of administrative and 
military officials, judges, religious scholars, and local merchants. They lived in urban 
centers, accumulated large supplies of cash, engaged in trade and credit operations in 
addition to tax farming, but had limited involvement in the reorganization of and 
investment in agriculture and the other economic activities they taxed. The central 
administration’s financial transactions with these local elites often went beyond 
collection of taxes and entailed provisions of emergency funds that allowed it to finance 
fluctuations in revenue needs. In the eighteenth century, the central administration also 
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delegated to the local notables the duty to maintain public order and asked them to join 
wars with their retinues.
22   
     The last decades of the seventeenth century were an especially difficult 
period for state finances. Following the unsuccessful siege of Vienna in 1683, 
the Ottomans lost a good deal of territory and retreated during an extended 
period of wars against an alliance of European powers, the Habsburgs, Poles and 
Russians. Not surprisingly, these pressures led to a period of major fiscal 
reforms, changes in fiscal institutions and the introduction of new taxes and 
revenue increasing measures.  
    One new institution introduced as part of the fiscal reforms at the end of the 
seventeenth century was the malikane system in which the revenue source began 
to be farmed out on a life-time basis in return for a large initial payment to be 
followed by specified flows of annual payments.
23 One rationale often offered 
for this system was that by extending terms of contracts, the state hoped that t
farmers might take better care of the tax source, most importantly the peasant 
producers, and try to achieve long term increases in production. In fact, the 
malikane allowed the state to use tax revenues as collateral and borrow on a 
longer term basis.  
ax-
                                                
    With the extension of terms and the introduction of larger advance payments, 
long term financing of the malikane contracts assumed an even greater 
importance. Behind the individual that bid in the tax-farming auctions, there 
often existed a partnership including the non-Muslim financiers as well as the 
agents organizing the tax collection process itself often by dividing the initial 
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contract into smaller pieces and finding sub-contractors.
24 Over the course of the 
eighteenth century, some 1,000 to 2,000 Istanbul based individuals, together with 
some 5,000 to 10,000 individuals based in the provinces, as well as innumerable 
contractors, agents, financiers, accountants and managers came to control an 
important share of the state’s revenues. Many elites in the provinces were able to 
acquire and pass from one generation to next small and medium sized malikane 
shares on villages as long as they retained favor with local administrators or their 
Istanbul sponsors. For both the well-connected individuals in the capital city and 
those in the provinces, getting a piece of government tax revenues became an 
activity more lucrative than investing in agriculture, trade or manufacturing. 
25 
    In the longer term, however, the malikane system did not fulfill the 
expectations of the central administration. It actually led to a decline in state 
revenues because of the inability of the state to regain control of its revenue 
sources after the death of the individuals who had purchased them.
26 The central 
administration began to experiment with other methods for tax collection and 
domestic borrowing as state finances came under further pressure from the 1770s 
onwards. After the end of the war of 1768-1774, which had dramatically exposed 
the military as well as fiscal weaknesses of the Ottoman system, the government 
introduced a new and related instrument of long-term domestic borrowing called 
esham. In this system, the annual net revenues of from tax source were specified 
in nominal terms. This amount was divided into a large number of shares which 
were sold to the public for the lifetime of the buyers. The annual revenues of the 
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source continued to be collected by the tax farmers.
27 As the linkage between the 
annual government payments and the underlying revenues of the tax source 
weakened, the esham increasingly resembled a life term annuity quite popular in 
many European countries at the time. 
28  
Evidence from the Ottoman Budgets , 1523 to 1788 
     The previous section emphasized the importance of wars and the fiscal 
pressures they generated, the willingness of the Ottomans to experiment with and 
embrace changes in their fiscal institutions in response and the greater role 
played in tax collection by rising groups of intermediaries after the 16
th century.  
In this section and the next, we will try to assess the outcome of these efforts by 
analyzing the long term trends in the revenues of the Ottoman state based on the 
evidence provided by the Ottoman budgets themselves. The Ottoman state 
prepared many “ex-post budgets” in the early modern era. These documents 
itemized and recorded the cash receipts of the central treasury as well as its 
expenditures. A recent project has brought together all of the more than 40 such 
documents that have been located to date in the Ottoman archives for the period 
1523 to 1788. 
29 
      Ottoman budgets present revenues and expenditures in current akçes. In order to 
facilitate inter-temporal and inter-country comparisons, we converted all monetary 
magnitudes to tons or grams of silver by multiplying the revenues in current akçes by its 
                                                 
27 Yavuz Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi: XVIII. yy.dan 
Tanzimat'a Mali Tarih, Alan Yayıncılık, Istanbul, 1986, pp. 81-83; also M. Genç, 
‘Esham’, Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 11, 1995, pp. 376-80.  
28 The Ottoman Empire remained outside the European capital markets network until the 
second half of the nineteenth century. In part because of this, interest rates in the Ottoman 
Empire remained significantly higher. Calculations based on some of the esham auctions 
suggest that, until the middle of the nineteenth century, interest rates at which the state 
could borrow remained in the 12 to 15 percent range and rose to the 15 to 20 percent 
range and even higher during periods of distress such as wars or monetary instability; 
Pamuk, A Monetary History, 191-2. 
29 M. Genç and E. Özvar (ed.), Osmanlı Maliyesi.   14
silver content.
30 In Graphs, 1, 2 and 3, we present two revenue series. The first series 
named Ottoman I refers to the cash receipts of the central administration in Istanbul, or 
the central treasury. The second series named Ottoman II includes, in addition to the cash 
receipts, the receipts of the central administration through the timar system in the form of 
cavalrymen and other auxiliary troop contributions in the military campaigns. Because a 
significant part of Ottoman military forces were supplied by the provinces until the 19
th 
century, Ottoman II series provides a more realistic, yet imprecise measure of Ottoman 
military capability. It has been estimated that the cash equivalent of the tax 
revenues collected by the cavalrymen exceeded by far the cash receipts of the 
central treasury during the sixteenth century.
31 After the timar system began to 
be replaced by the central administration in the seventeenth century in favor of a 
larger central army permanently stationed in the capital and other urban areas, its 
contribution began to decline. For this later period, we included in the Ottoman 
II series some allowance for the soldiers the provincial notables provided to the 
army. We estimate the share of these and other indirect contributions declined to 
less than 30 percent of total revenues of the central administration by the end of 
the eighteenth century. We will not use Series II in comparisons with European 
countries but present it nonetheless just to show that our results do not change much by 
the inclusion of these indirect revenues. 
32 
     In Graph 2 we present the per capita tax revenues of the Ottoman central 
administration obtained by dividing the total revenues in tons of silver by the population 
of the empire. For the purposes of this exercise, we have decided to exclude all the 
autonomous or semi-autonomous territories such as Crimea, Hungary, Wallachia and 
Moldavia (present day Romania), the Maghreb, that is, present day Libya, Tunis and 
Algeria and those regions of the Arabian Peninsula at least nominally controlled by the 
                                                 
30 The silver content of the akçe in different years are taken from the tables in Pamuk, A 
Monetary History. 
31 Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "H. 933-934 (M. 1527-1528) Mali Yilina Ait Bir Bütçe Örnegi”, 
Istanbul Üniversitesi Iktisat Fakültesi Mecmuasi 14 (1953-54), 251-329. 
32 Barkan ibid; M. Genç, “Osmanli Maliyesinde Mukataa Kavrami“, in M. Genç ve 
E. Özvar (ed.), Osmanlı Maliyesi, Vol. 1, 57-64.   15
Ottoman government. For the most part, these territories did not send any tax revenues to 
the central Treasury. This leaves us with the present day Balkans, present day Turkey, 
greater Syria and present day Iraq and Egypt. Since total population of these latter areas 
fluctuated narrowly between 19 and 22 million from 1550 to 1800, long term trends in 
per capita revenues of the central administration are very similar to those presented in 
tons of silver.
33 
      Graphs 1 and 2 indicate that the cash receipts of the Ottoman central administration, 
expressed in both tons of silver and also per capita terms and whether adjusted for silver 
inflation or not, increased until the third quarter of the sixteenth century. 
34 In many 
respects, the latter period represents the peak of Ottoman fiscal power and centralization 
in the early modern era. The revenues of the central administration tended to decline from 
the fourth quarter of the sixteenth century until the end of the seventeenth century despite 
the attempts to collect a higher share of its tax revenues in cash and directly at the center, 
as a large part of the revenues began to be retained by various intermediaries. In response 
to both the growing fiscal pressures and military defeats, the Ottoman government 
undertook major fiscal reforms at the end of the seventeenth century and these efforts 
succeeded in raising revenues significantly during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
                                                 
33 The Ottoman censuses of the sixteenth century provide information about the numbers 
of male tax payers. The conversion of these figures into estimates of total population 
poses many difficulties as household size varied greatly between regions, urban and rural 
households and over time. As a result, we chose to make use of large surveys of 
European and world population such as C. McEvedy and R. Jones, Atlas of World 
Population History, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1978, Paolo Malanima, Pre-Modern 
European Economy, One Thousand Years, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2009, 3-16 and 
Michael Palairet, The Balkan Economies c. 1800-1914, Cambridge University Press, 
1997. These sources are not without their problems but they provide us with more 
realistic and workable estimates of the total Ottoman population and its evolution over 
time. On the basis of these, we estimate the Ottoman population within the borders cited 
in the main text at 19 million in 1550, 21,3 million in 1600, 20,2 million in 1650, 20,4 
million in 1700, 19,8 million in 1750 and 21,5 million in 1800. We interpolated for the 
population estimates between these benchmark years, also taking into account the border 
changes especially in the Balkans.    
34 A large part of the large fluctuations the revenues of the central administration during 
the sixteenth century apparent in Graphs 1 and 2 are due to changes in definitions. 
Specifically, more revenue items were included under the budget document of 1527-28 
which may be overstating the actual revenues.     16
Revenues of the central administration declined once again during the second half of the 
eighteenth century, certainly until the 1780s for which we have evidence from the budget 
documents. Perhaps more important than these medium-term trends, however, was the 
absence of a long term upward trend in both per capita and total revenues during the early 
modern centuries as a whole. Graphs 1 and 2 make clear that per capita and total Ottoman 
revenues during the eighteenth century were not any higher than those in the sixteenth 
century. As we will emphasize in the next section, while Ottoman per capita and total 
revenues may have been comparable to those in other parts of Europe during the 
sixteenth century, both the per capita and total revenues of the Ottoman central 
administration appeared low in comparison to many others across Europe by the second 
half of the eighteenth century. 
       Another indicator that would enable us to gain further insights into the revenue 
collection capacity of the central government would have been to compare per capita 
revenues with some indicator of incomes, preferably average incomes. Unfortunately, our 
estimates of per capita incomes or per capita GDP in the early modern era are available 
only for a few benchmark years and even those are subject to some not insignificant 
margin of error. These admittedly crude estimates suggest that in the core areas of the 
empire, direct cash receipts of the Ottoman government, that is, the series Ottoman I in 
Graphs 1 and 2 probably remained below 4 percent of GDP during the early modern era. 
We similarly estimate that total revenues of the central administration including the 
monetary values of cavalry holders’ service, that is the Series Ottoman II in Graphs 1 and 
2 probably remained below 6 percent of GDP during the these centuries. Equally 
importantly, these ratios were lower in the second half of the eighteenth century in 
comparison to the second half of the sixteenth century. 
35  
      In contrast to estimates of GDP, data for the daily wages of construction workers in 
the urban centers, especially in the leading urban centers are much more abundant and 
much more reliable both for the Ottoman Empire and other European countries. For this 
reason, we chose to follow the recent lead of other economic historians of the early 
                                                 
35 Based on Ş. Pamuk” Estimating GDP per capita for the Ottoman Empire in a European 
Comparative Framework, 1500-1820”, paper presented at the XVth World Economic 
Congress, Utrecht, 2009.    17
modern era and calculated the annual per capita tax revenues of the central administration 
as a multiple of the daily wages of unskilled construction workers in the capital city. 
Daily wages in Istanbul were quite comparable to those in other urban centers such as 
Edirne, Bursa, Belgrade, Salonika, Jerusalem and others until the nineteenth century.
36  
The series presented in Graph 3 indicate that the basic trend in the tax revenues of the 
Ottoman central administration during the early modern era was also horizontal. Equally 
importantly, they show very clearly that the Ottoman government’s capacity to collect 
taxes remained strikingly low. Annual per capita cash revenues of the central 
administration did not exceed three days of wages of an unskilled construction worker in 
Istanbul and remained below two days of wages for most of this period. Even when we 
include indirect revenues such as the contributions of tımar and other soldiers in military 
campaigns, per capita revenues of the central administration rarely exceeded four days of 
wages in any given year.   
         It is not easy to estimate the total tax burden and the shares of various 
intermediaries in the Ottoman fiscal system. The basic difficulty is that the 
comprehensive records for the provinces are not available, and it is not clear whether all 
exactions were recorded in a standard fashion in the first place. The few available 
estimates and accounts of taxation in individual regions suggest that the tax burden 
increased after the 16th century, but the amount retained by the rising provincial elites 
also rose, resulting in the observed pattern of stagnant revenues for the center. It has been 
estimated that the share of Ottoman central treasury’s revenue in the total burden on 
taxpayers declined from 46 percent in 1527-28 to 25 percent in 1661-1662
37. The decline 
in central treasury’s share might have been more dramatic than these figures suggest, 
because 17th century also witnessed an increase in illegal and thus unrecorded exactions 
by provincial notables. Estimates by Mehmet Genç for the eighteenth century suggest 
                                                 
36 Ş. Pamuk, 500 Years of Prices and Wages in Istanbul and Other Cities, State Institute 
of Statistics, Ankara, 2001; Süleyman Özmucur and Ş. Pamuk, “Real Wages and 
Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914”, The Journal of Economic 
History, 62, 2002, 292-321; regarding the use of urban wages as a measure of 
standards of living in the Ottoman context, see the discussion in ibid, 313-16.    
37 Baki Çakır,“Geleneksel dönem (Tanzimat öncesi) Osmanli Bütçe Gelirleri” in E. 
Özvar and M., Genç, (eds.). Osmanlı Maliyesi  pp. 167-8   18
that approximately two thirds of the net tax revenues, that is, of gross tax collections 
minus expenses, went to the taxfarmers, financiers and high level bureaucrats who 
divided up the large tax-farms amongst themselves in the capital city. Only one third of 
the net receipts ended in the central treasury.
 38 It is thus clear that the inability to keep a 
tight rein on the amounts retained by these intermediaries limited the effectiveness of 
Ottoman fiscal reforms during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Comparisons with Other European States in the Early Modern Era 
     This section presents the summary results of the comparisons we have undertaken 
between Ottoman central administration’s revenues in the early modern era with those of 
the leading European states, England, France, the Dutch Republic, Spain, Venice, 
Austria, Prussia, Poland and Russia. For each polity, the series for the net receipts of the 
central treasury was converted to tons of silver by multiplying it with the silver content of 
the unit of account. We have taken great care to apply similar definitions of revenue to all 
the states, but the limitations imposed by the variations in accounting procedures and 
fiscal structures should be kept in mind.  
      Graphs 4 and 5 present total revenues of the leading European states including the 
Ottoman Empire during the early modern era. A number of interesting patterns emerge 
from these graphs. The revenue of the Ottoman central administration was comparable to 
those of large European states during the sixteenth century. In fact, Ottoman revenue was 
greater than all European states except France and Spain. This pattern is consistent with 
Ottoman military power vis a vis the leading European states as the Ottomans did quite 
well militarily during the sixteenth century. Per capita tax revenues of the Ottoman 
central administration were comparable with those of larger European states but was 
below those of city states like Venice and Holland in the sixteenth century. 
     Graphs 4 and 5 make clear that revenues of most European states increased sharply 
during the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth centuries. Most striking in this 
respect were England and Holland but others including Austria and Russia also 
                                                 
38 M. Genç, “Iltizam, Islam Ansiklopedisi, Turk Diyanet Vakfi, 1997; also cited in M. 
Çizakça, Comparative Evolution, 165-68.   19
experienced significant increases in tax revenues. At a time when the Ottoman central 
administration was struggling with the adverse effects of political and fiscal 
decentralization, these large increases in revenues across Europe led to the emergence of 
large differences in state revenues between the Ottomans and most European states. 
These differences reached their peak, in most cases, during the second half of the 
eighteenth century when the revenues not only of the more successful and more powerful 
states in western Europe but also those in central and eastern Europe such as Austrian 
Monarchy and Russia with which the Ottomans engaged militarily increased sharply.  
 
                                                        Table 1  
    Sizes of Armies and Navies of different Countries, 1550-1780 (in thousands) 
                                            1550                        1700                     1780 
                                        A           N               A           N             A           N 
England                           41         25              76        115           79         109 
France                             43         14            224        118          183          85 
Dutch Republic                                              90          86            27          22 
Spain                             145          18             37          26            64          62 
Austria                              9            0             62            0          253            0           
Prussia                                                            37           0           181           0 
Russia                                                            52            0          408          19 
Ottoman Empire              90          50          130          30          120          30 
 
Source: Data set prepared by Peter Brecke,, http://www.inta.gatech.edu/peter/power.html; 
for the Ottoman Empire, Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700, UCL Press, 
London, 1999, 35-59 and Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire 
Besieged, Pearson-Longman, Harlow, 2007, 45-179. 
 
       As Table 1 makes clear, while the sizes of armies were rising across Europe 
especially during the eighteenth century, the Ottomans remained mostly outside this 
trend. This long term shift in the fiscal and military balance of power is consistent with 
what happened in the battlefield. After a long period of territorial expansion into Europe, 
the Ottomans began to be matched by the Habsburgs by the end of the sixteenth century. 
Nonetheless, they were able to make another major attempt at Vienna towards the end of 
the seventeenth century only to be defeated by a large coalition of central and eastern 
European states. Thanks in large part due to the fiscal reforms that show very clearly in 
our revenue series, the Ottomans were then able to hold their own militarily against 
Austria, Venice and Russia during the first half of the eighteenth century. As the fiscal   20
gap widened further during the second half of the eighteenth century, however, Ottoman 
military performance began to falter. They were defeated in most of the wars that took 
place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries against Austria and Russia. The 
literature on military history recognizes the fiscal constraints but emphasizes more the 
gaps in military organization and technology between the two sides and the lack of 
discipline amongst the Ottoman soldiers to explain the Ottoman defeats. We would argue 
that the low fiscal capacity of the Ottoman central administration especially during the 
eighteenth century should be seen as a major cause of the differences military technology 
as well as the absence of discipline amongst the janissaries as the latter were often poorly 
equipped and rarely paid in full or on time.
39 
 
Why did Ottoman Central Revenues Lag in the Early Modern Era ?  
 
Equation 1A: Total Tax Revenues in Tons of Silver  = Total GDP in Tons of Silver * 
Tax Revenues as percent of GDP  or  
Equation 1B:   Total Tax Revenues in Tons of Silver  = Population  *  Real GDP per 
capita  * Price Level in grams silver  * Tax Revenues as percent of GDP    
 
     As Equations 1A and 1B make clear, the emerging differences in tax revenues 
measured in tons of silver between the Ottoman Empire and other European states during 
the early modern era can be analyzed under four headings. One important cause was the 
significant differences in population trends. The population of the Ottoman Empire 
changed very little from the middle of the sixteenth century until the end of the 
eighteenth century. This is the case even if we exclude those areas that seceded from the 
Ottoman Empire and limit our inter-temporal comparisons to areas within the same 
borders. In contrast, population in most European countries that are included in our 
                                                 
39 For the Ottoman military in the earlier period, Rhodes Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 
1500-1700, UCL Press, London, 1999; for the 18
th century, Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman 
Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged, Pearson-Longman, Harlow, 2007 and Gabor 
Agoston, Guns for the Sultan, Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman 
Empire, Cambridge University Press, 2005.    21
comparisons increased sharply during the early modern centuries, doubling or more than 
doubling in many cases.
40   
     Another cause for the emerging differences in total revenues in tons of silver was the 
changing price levels in terms of silver. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, 
before the impact of the Price Revolution began to be felt in Europe and the Near East, 
price levels in southern Europe and the Ottoman Empire were higher than those in the 
rest of Europe. During the next three centuries, however, price levels in northwestern and 
more generally western Europe, measured in silver terms, increased much more as rising 
incomes and wages which pulled up the prices of services and other non-tradable goods. 
As a result, price levels measured in silver terms in northwestern Europe were twice as 
high as those in the Ottoman Empire and in Italy by the second half of the eighteenth 
century.
41 With a higher price level in silver terms, states tended to collect more taxes 
measured in tons of silver. However, even though there was a common market for 
mercenaries in Europe, it is reasonable to assume it cost more in northwestern and more 
generally in Western Europe to buy the same basket of military goods including soldiers 
and equipment. In other words, this component of the growing difference in tax revenues 
did not necessarily translate into differences in military power.   
        Equation 1B suggests another potential cause of the growing differences in revenues 
was the differences in GDP per capita. Per capita GDP and incomes were rising rapidly in 
England and the Dutch Republic during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. By the 
second half of the eighteenth century, per capita GDP and incomes in these countries 
were approximately double those in the Ottoman Empire. In contrast, however, per capita 
GDP in the rest of the continent did not show any strong trend during the early modern 
era, rising to some extent in Western Europe but probably declining in southern Europe, 
especially in Italy. As a result, differences in terms of GDP per capita between the latter 
                                                 
40 McEvedy and Jones, Atlas; Malanima, Pre-Modern. 
41 Robert C. Allen, “The Great Divergence in European Wages and Prices from the 
Middle Ages to the First World War”, Explorations in Economic History, 38, 2001, pp. 
411-47; Ozmucur and Pamuk, “Real Wages”.    22
countries and the Ottoman Empire remained relatively limited until the nineteenth 
century.
42  
     The first three causes of the emerging differences in tax revenues cited above, 
population, the price level and real GDP per capita are all, by definition, components of 
nominal GDP. In other words, one basic reason for the emerging differences in total 
revenues between the Ottomans, on the one hand, and the most of the continental 
European countries, on the other, was the growing differences in nominal GDP. Of these 
three components, changes in population and the price level contributed more to the 
growing differences in total tax revenues than did the changes in the level of GDP per 
capita, except for England and the Dutch Republic where increases in the GDP per capita 
were also significant.  
      The final cause of the emerging differences in revenues was the rapidly growing 
differences in tax revenues of the central administrations as a percent of GDP or total 
income. Our calculations, again subject to some degree of error due to the shortcomings 
of the existing GDP per capita estimates for the early modern era, suggest that share of 
tax revenues of the central administration as a percent of GDP or total incomes rose in 
most of the European countries from less than 5 percent in the sixteenth century to a 
range between 5 and 10 percent and in a small number of cases that include Britain and 
the Netherlands to more than 10 percent by the 1780s.
43 A more reliable way to measure 
the differences in the capacity of states to collect tax revenues or the tax burden of the 
population would be to compare the per capita tax revenues of the states with the daily 
wages of unskilled workers. Graph 3 above suggested that ratio of per capita tax revenues 
of the Ottoman central administration to daily wages of unskilled construction workers 
remained low during the early modern centuries. In sharp contrast, Graph 6 makes clear 
                                                 
42 Based on Van Zanden, “Early Modern Economic Growth”; Maddison, The World 
Economy, Historical Statistics; also Carlos Alvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la 
Escosura, “The decline of Spain, 1500-1850, Conjectural estimates”, European Review of 
Economic History, Vol. 11, 2007, 319-66; these GDP per capita estimates are not precise 
but for our present purposes, they give a reasonable good idea of the basic trends.  
43 For example O'Brien, and Hunt estimate that the tax revenues over GDP ratio exceeded 
10 percent in England before the end of the eighteenth century. “England, 1485-1815”,  
53-100.   23
the same ratio rose significantly in most European countries during the early modern era. 
Graph 6 indicates further that the differences between the Ottoman Empire and most 
other European states in this respect widened substantially during the eighteenth century.        
           Increases in the revenue over GDP ratios and in the revenues per capita over the 
daily wage ratios in many European countries despite the limited increases in per capita 
real GDPs during the early modern era suggest that the increases in the fiscal capabilities 
of centralized administrations preceded the rapid economic growth of the 19
th century. 
One determinant of an administration’s fiscal capacity was the size of money stock and 
degree of monetization.
44 Monetization was a necessary condition for centralizing 
finances, because it allowed transferring  revenues to the political center, paying a 
standing central army or mercenaries in cash, investing in military technologies and 
training, and if necessary redistributing the funds around the country. Had it not been for 
a thirty-three-fold increase in the silver coinage in the Old World between 1500 and 
1800, centralization of European fiscal systems might not have occurred.
45  Within 
Europe, there was a lag in increases in per capita money stock as one moved from west to 
east. In the Ottoman case, the trajectory of monetary system mimics that of the 
administration’s political fortunes. Ottoman money stock is estimated at 1000-1500 tons 
of silver at the end of 15th century. 
46 France’s money stock at the same period was 
around 700 tons, implying a roughly similar per capita money stock.
47 Money economy 
spread in the Ottoman countryside in the 16th century, but the trend was reversed in the 
17th. It is conjectured that due to trade deficit with the east, Ottoman economy did not 
accumulate American silver, the administration found it difficult to locate silver supplies, 
and the number of mints decreased from more than 40 in the 16
th century to a few in the 
17th. The Ottoman administration also contrasted with most European states by not 
adopting mercantilism, through it is difficult to ascertain the policy’s exact impact on the 
monetary breakdown. It is reasonable to assume that the breakdown of monetary system 
                                                 
44 Tilly, Coercion, 88-89. 
45 Michael George Mulhall, The Dictionary of Statistics, Fourth Edition, 1903, 306-10. 
46 Pamuk, Monetary History, 51-2.  
47 Debra Glassman, and Angela Redish,“'New Estimates of the Money Stock in France, 
1493-1680”. This Journal, XLV, 1985, 31 – 46.   24
hampered Ottoman administration’s attempt to monetize tax collection through tax 
farming. 
      Moreover, a significant part of the rise in the central revenues over GDP ratios was 
due to centralization of taxes rather than increases in the tax burden per se. As a case in 
point, the 18
th century increase in English revenue over GDP ratio occurred 
simultaneously with consolidation of around ninety percent of the gross tax revenue at 
the central treasury. Consolidation was achieved by the reforms after 1660, including 
unification of tax administration under Treasury Board, abolition of tax farming and 
centralization of upkeep of armed forces.
48 To offer a contrast, in Ancien Regime France, 
it is estimated that only forty percent of the gross tax collection made it to the central 
treasury
49. 
    If it is indeed the centralization of fiscal administration that drove the gains in 
revenues, comparing the figures across polities should help identify underlying 
determinants. A visible pattern is that small, densely populated and urbanized polities, 
such as England, Venice and the Dutch Republic, had higher per capita revenues than 
large territorial states like the Ottomans. As distances from the capital cities increased, 
the logistics of transferring the tax extraction to the center and back became more 
difficult, and a larger share of the gross tax revenue was spent without entering the 
central coffers and budgets. In fact, in larger polities, the great share of the revenues were 
extracted from core provinces, such as Castile in Spain, pays d’Election in France, and 
Anatolia and Balkans in the Ottomans, and outer regions contributed smaller amounts 
sporadically. A survey of the polities also suggests territorial empires tended to have 
larger agrarian sectors which were harder to monitor and hence necessitated elaborate tax 
apparatuses with multiple layers of intermediation that resulted in lower net revenues to 
the center.  
     Another major determinant of the fiscal capacity of the states was politics and the 
institutional framework that governed the relationship between the central 
                                                 
48 Pamuk, Monetary History, 54-5.  
49 John P. LeDonne, Absolutism and Ruling Class: The Formation of the Russian 
Political Order, 1700-1825. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 269   25
administrations and tax intermediaries. All across Europe, tax collection depended on 
politics, on the bargains reached between the central governments and various social 
groups, and the institutions that emerged during that process. It has been argued that 
parliamentary or representative regimes were able to apply taxes to broader sections of 
the economy and collect more taxes because the representative bodies helped negotiate 
and sanction fiscal demands in return for limits on the power of the monarch, especially 
during periods of fiscal crises.
50 However, it is not easy to identify simple patterns that 
characterized the relations between the central administrations and the provincial elites 
during the early modern era.  
     The historiography of the 17
th and 18
th centuries has argued that the hurdles Ottoman 
central administration faced on fiscal and military fronts were both driven by the same 
underlying challenge of reorganizing and expanding centrally administered and 
provisioned infantry troops and other specialized units.
51 This line of argument suggests 
that the fiscal difficulties were closely associated with the lack of monopolization and 
centralization of military forces. Instead, along with their growing role in tax farming 
contracts and allocation of extraordinary avariz taxes, major ayan families in different 
parts of the Empire formed their own retinues with firearms. These forces played an 
essential role in enforcing tax collection at the local level and also provided leverage 
when they bargained with the central administration over tax contracts and for privileges 
in exchange for joining the army during episodes of war and suppressing local banditry. 
As the ayan families remained financially dependent on their role in the tax apparatus, 
the central administration was careful to foster rival families in each region competing for 
contracts and assignments. Hence the histories of individual ayan families point to 
episodes of rewards and promotion alternating with confiscation of estates and executions 
                                                 
50 For example, Hoffman and Norberg,“Conclusion” and Hoffman and J. Rosenthal,“The 
Political Economy” and Dincecco, “Fiscal Centralization”. 
51 İnalcık, “Military and Fiscal Transformation” and “Centralization and 
Decentralization”; Y. Cezar, Osmanlı Maliyesinde Bunalım ve Değişim Dönemi (XVIII. 
Yüzyıldan Tanzimata Mali Tarih), Istanbul, Alan Yayıncılık, 1986; V. H. Aksan, 
Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged, Pearson-Longman, Harlow, 2007; Y. 
Özkaya, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Âyânlık, Turk Tarih Kurumu Yayinları, Ankara, 
1994; Suraiya Faroqhi,"Crisis and Change, 1590-1699,” in İnalcık, Halil and Quataert, 
Donald (eds.), An Economic and Social History , 411-636.   26
justified as punishments for war profiteering and failure to fulfill obligations.
52 The 
Ottoman pattern of control over provincial violence through negotiated, selective and 
short term co-optation of an evolving array semi-autonomous military formations and 
contractors contrasts with the European pattern particularly from mid-17
th century on. 
Following continent-wide depredations in the first half of that century, military 
contractors and entrepreneurs who had previously recruited troops began to be phased out 
and small scale warfare on a local or regional level was replaced by large scale 
international wars across Europe.
53 This contrast suggests the set of technological and 
organization challenges on the path from the elite infantry and prebendal cavalry to mass 
conscription might have played a major role in delaying Ottoman fiscal centralization. 
        The Ottoman administration and provincial notables often cooperated in tax 
collection and military service during the 17
th and 18
th centuries, but without a long term, 
credible and stable political deal with well defined obligations and privileges. Such a deal 
called Sened-i Ittifak (Document of Alliance) was signed only in 1808 during a severe 
political crisis that threatened the survival of the empire but it did not remain in effect for 
long as the many sides chose not to honor it. In the absence of such a deal, the central 
administration had severe difficulties in ensuring a steady supply of tax revenues and this 
problem turned into a severe crisis during the period of wars and internal rebellions and 
nationalist uprisings that lasted from the 1760s to the 1830s. While fiscally successful 
European states were able to deal better with the large fiscal shocks created by the wars 
by managing their public debt and avoiding debasements, the series of wars, internal 
rebellions and nationalist uprisings created very serious problems for the Ottoman central 
administration. It was forced not only to resort to frequent debasements during these 
decades but also employ practices such as extraordinary taxes, fiscally motivated local 
monopolies on domestic and external trade and expropriations of the wealth of former 
state officials. Perhaps even more important, was the decline in internal security as well 
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as external security. All of these led to a macroeconomic and institutional environment 
that was highly unfavorable for long-term economic development.
54 
Modern Era Reforms, Fiscal Centralization and Evidence from 
Ottoman Budgets, 1800-1914 
     As military defeats and territorial losses escalated, the Ottoman central administration 
struggled to implement a series of centralizing reforms in the military, administrative and 
fiscal areas. Not surprisingly, these efforts began during the reign of Selim III (1789-
1808) when the revenues of the central administration in tons of silver and in inflation 
adjusted terms reached their low point but progress was limited especially due to the 
opposition of the janissaries. His successor Mahmud II (1808-1839) continued 
with the reforms especially after he defeated the janissaries in 1826 and revoked 
the remaining timars in 1831. The reign of Mahmud II was a particularly difficult 
period for the central administration. While it was able to suppress the various 
uprisings of notables in both the Balkans and Anatolia, the Serbian and Greek 
revolutions led to the secession of these territories from the empire. Much more 
costly to the state finances than any of these was a series of wars against Russia, 
Iran and Egypt. As the size of the new army (Nizam-i Cedid) rose from a mere 
2,000 around the turn of the century to 120,000 in the late 1830s, pressures on 
state finances increased.
55 About half of the budget expenditures were allocated 
for military spending from the late eighteenth until the 1840s; this share was 
considerably higher during periods of war.
56 The first modern Ottoman census and 
cadastral survey in 1831 closely followed the foundation of the new army and was 
motivated by the need to raise manpower and money for the foundation of his new army.  
      As the reform movement began to spread beyond the military arena in the 
1820s, to administration, justice, and education, demands for resources increased 
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as well. From the 1760s Ottoman state finances began to experience large budget 
deficits which reached their peak during the wars of the 1820s and 1830s. In 
response, the state attempted to eliminate the intermediaries or at least sharply 
reduce their power and control of resources both in the capital and the provinces, 
made use of various forms of internal borrowing, and when short term fiscal 
pressures mounted especially during periods of war, resorted to debasements. 
The highest rates of debasement and inflation in Ottoman history took place 
during the reign of the centralizing and reformist sultan Mahmud II. The silver 
content of the Ottoman kurush or piaster declined by more than 80 percent from 
1808 to 1839. The exchange rate of the kurush against the British pound sterling 
declined from 18 in 1808 to 110 per pound in 1844. Consumer prices increased 
by more than 5 fold during the same period.
57 
      A number of scholars have identified Mahmud II’s reforms as an example of 
“defensive modernization” and have noted the parallels between them and Petrine 
reforms in Russia and Meiji Restoration in Japan. These comparisons point out that all of 
these reforms were motivated primarily by military defeats and territorial losses and 
hence at their heart lay the drive to acquire and mobilize the means of war for survival 
and defense against aggresion from outside. 
58 
    In the longer term, the reforms helped the central government. Especially after 
the abolition of the janissaries, it began to move against the provincial notables 
and their fiscal power. As part of the Tanzimat reforms of 1839, the central 
administration attempted to abolish the tax farming system altogether and collect 
agricultural taxes directly. In the absence of a strong provincial organization, 
however, central revenues collapsed and the tax farmers had to be brought back. 
Nonetheless, the central administration succeeded in wresting greater control of 
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the tax collection process and sharply increase its revenues. The deal signed 
between the center and the provincial elites in 1808 was never put into effect and 
the power of the latter declined steadily during the nineteenth century. The first 
Ottoman parliament where the provincial elites were represented was opened in 
1876 but lasted little more than a year. The parliament and empire wide elections 
returned only after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. During the second half 
of the century, when the central administration pushed to increase its revenues further, 
tax collectors were often met with opposition in the countryside and security forces were 
often called in to deal with the resistance.
59 
     Around mid-century, the financing of the budget deficits reached a new 
phase. Under the fiscal pressures created by the Crimean War, the Ottoman 
government began to borrow in the European financial markets in 1854. After 
two decades of rapid borrowing the proceeds of which were used mostly for 
military expenditures, the government was forced to declare a moratorium in 
debt payments in 1876. After a prolonged period of negotiations and in return for 
a 50 percent reduction on the outstanding nominal debt, the government agreed 
in 1881 to cede large segments of its revenue sources to the Ottoman Public Debt 
Administration to be developed for the purposes of future debt payments. The 
Ottoman Public Debt Administration remained in place until World War I. 
     Ottoman budget documents do not exist from the end of the 1780s to the end of the 
1830s. This is perhaps not surprising as this was a period of rapid and far reaching 
institutional changes for Ottoman state finances. As part of the centralization efforts, 
the multi-treasuries and budgets of the earlier era were gradually dissolved for 
the single budget system. Revenues of the central administration rose as many of the 
revenue sources were incorporated to the central budgets. 
     For the period from the 1840s to World War I, all of the ex-post Ottoman 
budgetary documents have been collected and published in a recent volume by 
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Tevfik Güran.
60  For these Ottoman budgets too we converted all revenues given 
in kurushes into tons of silver. Graph 7 presents revenues of the Ottoman central 
administration during the nineteenth century in tons of silver and Graph 8 
presents per capita revenues as a multiple of the daily wage of unskilled 
construction workers in the capital city. These series show unequivocally that the 
centralizing reforms that began at the end of the eighteenth century and 
continued until World War I, led to large increases in the revenues of the central 
administration.
61  
     This sharp rise in revenues during the nineteenth century in many ways reflected an 
attempt at catching up for the Ottoman central administration. Since most European states 
had experienced significant increases in revenues during the early modern era, especially 
during the eighteenth century when the Ottoman revenues were in fact declining, the 
trends summarized in Graphs 7 and 8 reflect the results of delayed political and fiscal 
centralization for the Ottomans. This rise in revenues undoubtedly helped the Ottoman 
government to improve its military capabilities and keep the empire together until World 
War I. The revenues of many European states also continued to rise during the nineteenth 
century, however. This was not so much or only because of continued fiscal 
centralization and the rise in the revenues / GDP  or revenues per capita / daily wages 
ratios but also because of the onset of rapid economic growth and increases in GDP per 
capita as well as in population and total GDP. Countries in western Europe such as Great 
Britain and the Netherlands which had experienced the greatest degree of fiscal 
centralization before the nineteenth century witnessed a decline in the revenues / GDP or 
revenues per capita / daily wages ratios but their per capita revenues continued to rise 
thanks to rapid economic growth. On the other hand, countries with lower levels of fiscal 
centralization before the nineteenth century, not only France, Spain, and Portugal but also 
Austria, Russia and Italy experienced large increases in per capita revenues due to 
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61 Central administration revenues shown in Graphs 7 and 8 do not include the revenue 
sources ceded to the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (OPDA) after the Ottoman 
government defaulted on its debt in 1876. We estimate that the annual revenues of the 
OPDA from these sources amounted to an additional 1 to 2 percent of Ottoman GDP 
during the decades before World War I.   31
continued fiscal centralization and even more due to economic growth. 
62 As a result, 
even though it experienced significant fiscal centralization, the fiscal and military 
capacities of the Ottoman government continued to lag behind most European states until 





    The evolution of Ottoman tax collection institutions during the early modern 
centuries illustrates, on the one hand, the willingness and capacity of the 
Ottomans to reorganize in response to the emergencies created by wars and other 
fiscal pressures. The pragmatism and flexibility exhibited during this process 
also provides important clues for understanding the longevity of the empire as 
well as the key position of the central bureaucracy until the end. At the same time, 
however, our study has revealed not only that the revenues of the Ottoman central 
administration remained low in absolute terms but the gap between the Ottomans and 
most European states increased dramatically during the early modern era, especially 
during the eighteenth century.  
       Undoubtedly, part of these large differences in tax revenues were due to higher rates 
of population growth, monetization and urbanization in other parts of Europe, especially 
in western Europe, which made it easier for the central administrations to collect taxes. 
These basic and important causes can not account for all of the large gap, however. In 
fact, total tax collections in the Ottoman Empire were much larger than the revenues of 
the Ottoman central administration but the latter was forced to share a large part of these 
revenues with various intermediaries. Even though the central and provincial notables 
often cooperated in tax collection and military service, a long-term, credible and stable 
political deal with well defined obligations and privileges was never put into effect.  
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the price of silver after 1870, we chose to present the per capita revenue series for the 
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       The growing fiscal and military disparities against the European states to the west 
and north placed enormous pressures on the Ottoman state, its finances and the economy. 
The fiscal difficulties of the central administration forced it not only to resort to frequent 
debasements but also employ practices such as extraordinary taxes and expropriations of 
the wealth of former state officials. Perhaps even more important, was the decline in 
internal security as well as external security due to the fiscal difficulties of the 
government. All of these led to an institutional environment that became distinctly less 
for long term economic development for large parts of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. We believe that the recent historiography of the Ottoman Empire in the early 
modern era has not paid sufficient attention to these fiscal issues. The grand alliance 
between the central government and the ayan in the provinces has been hailed as the key 
to the unity of the empire but the fiscal, military and economic consequences of the 
surrender of large revenues to the intermediaries have not been fully understood or 
appreciated. 
       During the nineteenth century, with the support of new military and transportation 
technologies, the Ottoman state embarked on a large centralization drive that succeeded 
in sharply raising its revenues. This was achieved not so much by reaching a deal 
with the notables in the provinces but by reducing their share of the tax revenues 
with the help of the military and other technologies of the nineteenth century. 
Higher revenues enabled the Ottomans to improve their military performance but state 
finances remained the Achilles’ heel of the Ottoman state until World War I.        
      Examining Ottoman state finances in the early modern era within a European 
framework has provided important insights not only into the Ottoman case but 
also the emergence of centralized states across Europe. Study of the Ottoman 
case confirms that the rise of more centralized and bigger states intensified the 
interstate rivalry and put additional pressure on all states across Europe. Not all were able 
to respond, at least not quickly, however, as revealed by the military defeats the 
Ottomans endured especially between the 1760s and the 1830s.  On the other hand, the 
Ottomans’ ability to undertake the centralizing reforms and raise their revenues during 
the nineteenth century should remind us that other countries in the European periphery, 
Russia, Italy and others were able to respond to these pressures, but often with a lag. In   33
other words, while fiscal centralization began in western Europe during the early modern 
centuries, the response to it in the European periphery often did not arrive until the 
nineteenth century.  
 
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
The revenue figures are averages of annual revenues to central treasuries. There were 
differences in fiscal systems and budgeting procedures across Europe, and each fiscal 
system underwent significant changes over the centuries. To the extent the available 
historical data permits, the figures represent net monetary revenues of the central 
administrations exclusive of loan receipts. We did not interpolate the revenue figures for 
missing years when calculating the averages.  In graphs 5 and 6, for decades where no 
revenue data was available, we used the average of the figures for preceding and 
following decades. Population figures, for which less frequent estimates are available, 
were interpolated. In order to be able to compare the figures across polities, the revenue 
figures are converted from domestic currencies to silver. For the 19
th and early 20
th 
centuries, to account for decline in the value of silver and the switch to the Gold 
Standard, we also calculated the revenue figures in terms of gold using the price ratio for 




Sources for revenue series are Berenger (1995) for 1650-1699, Dickson (1995) for 1717-
1778 and Mitchell (2003) for 1781-1909. Since Hungary had a separate treasury after 
1868-1909 its revenues were added to Austrian figures.  To account for different 
domestic currency units we used the conversion rates 1 Florin=1 Gulden=60 Kreuzer and 
1 Gulden=2 Kronen. To convert the revenues from domestic currency to silver we used 
silver value of Kreuzer between 1650-1753 from Allen (2003) and 1 Gulden =11.5 grams 
of silver between 1754-1818. For 1819-1909 since silver value of domestic currency was 
not available we first converted the revenues from domestic currency to British Pounds 
using exchange rates available at Global Financial Database and then converted the 
resulting figures to silver according to Allen (2003). The urban wages are for Vienna 
from Allen (2003). Population figures are for Austria-Hungary from McEvedy and Jones 
(1978)  
 
Dutch Republic/the Netherlands 
For 1609-1794 we used revenue series from Fritschy (2009) subtracting the estimated 
loan receipts. Revenues for 1817-1842 are from Fritschy and Van der Voort (1997) and 
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period are generally consistent with the estimates in Dincecco (2009) but our estimates 
for Prussia and Spain are higher. The differences for these two polities are mainly due to 
a different method we used to convert the revenues from the domestic currency to gold, 
as explained in the text.   34
for 1845-1909 from Mitchell (2003). For these years we converted the figures in Guilders 
to silver according to Allen (2003). Wages are for Amsterdam, from the same source. 
Population is from de Vries and van der Woude (1997) for 1600-1800 and Mitchell 
(2003) for 1816-1909. 
 
England/ Great Britain/ United Kingdom 
The revenue figures are total revenues of the English Crown for 1500-1749 from O’Brien 
(1995), central government revenue of Great Britain for 1750-1801 and of United 
Kingdom for 1802-1909 from Mitchell (2003).  
Population figures are for England and Wales from 1500 to 1707. To account for political 
unions, the population of Scotland is added after 1707 and Ireland is added after 1801. 
Population estimates are from McEvedy and Jones (1978) for England and Wales until 
1801, Scotland until 1755, Ireland until 1821. Mitchell (2003) is used for the later dates.  
Wages are for London from Allen (2003). 
 
France 
The revenue figures are from Bean (1973) for 1500-1546, Hoffman (1986) for 1560-
1779, White (1989) for 1783 and 1788 and Mitchell (2003) for 1815-1909. The silver 
value of livre tournois and Franc and wages for Paris are from Allen (2003).  Population 
series are from McEvedy and Jones (1978) until 1800 and Mitchell (2003) thereafter.  
 
Ottoman Empire: 
See text.  
 
Poland Lithuania:  
Polish-Lithuanian fiscal apparatus remained decentralized through the early modern era. 
The permanent revenues of kwarta purse were insufficient to cover military expenses, 
and the kings remained dependent on temporary and irregular grants by the nobility 
dominated Sejm (Filipczak-Kocur 1995). For these reasons the revenue figures are 
subject to greater variance and less precise compared to other polities in our sample. The 
figures for 1500, 1510, 1530, 1563, 1569, 1730, 1765, 1775 and 1791 are state revenues 
from Stone (2001). The figures for 1788, 1789 and 1790 are state revenues from Lewitter 
(1976).  The figures for 1576-1717 are the total of kwarta and sejm revenues from 
Filipczak-Kocur (1995). For 1649-1717 and 1576-1587 the figures are for Kingdom of 
Poland only. Silver content of Zloty is from Wójtowicz (2006). Wages are for Krakow in 
the 16th and for Warshaw in 17th and 18th centuries from Allen (2003). Population is 
from McEvedy and Jones (1978).  
 
Prussia:  
Revenue series are from Kellenbenz (1980) for 1600-1661, Korner (1995) for 1688-1806 
and Mauersberg (1988) for 1821-1905. Population is from McEvedy and Jones(1978) 
until 1806 and Mauersberg (1988) for 1819-1910. Since wage series is not available for a 
Prussian town we used Leipzig series from Allen (2003) as a substitute. Silver content of 
Thaler until 1873 is from Shaw (1895).  For 1895-1905 we converted the revenue figures 
into Pounds using the rates 1 Thaler =3 Marks and 1 Pound= 20.43 Marks, and then to 
silver according to silver value of Pound from Allen (2003).   35
 
Republic of Venice 
Revenue, population and wage data were provided by Luciano Pezzolo. 
 
Russia: 
Sources for revenues are Anisimov (1982) for 1680, 1701 and 1724, Kahan (1985) for 
1720-3 and 1763-96, Troitskii (1966) for 1749, 1751 and 1758, and Mitchell (2003) for 
1803-1909. Population is for Russian Empire from McEvedy and Jones (1978). Silver 




The Spanish revenue figures are for Castilian Crown until 1716 and Spanish Crown 
thereafter. Sources are Thompson (1994) for 1504-1546, 1607-1645 and 1674, Mauro 
and Parker (1980) for 1515 and 1623, Drelichman and Voth  (2007) for 1555-1596, 
Kamen (1980) for 1666, Kamen (1974) for 1703-1718, Ozanam (1978) for 1722-1750, 
Galebert (1995) for 1753-1788, Cuenca Esteban (1981) for 1789-1807 and 1815-1820, 
Tortella and Comin (2001) for 1824-1842 and Mitchell (2003) for 1850-1909. 
To account for different domestic currency units we used the rates 1 Ducat=11 Reales de 
Vellón =374 Mavaredis and 1 Peseta= 4 Reales de Vellón. Silver value of Maravedis for 
1504-1800 and Pesetas for 1801-1909 are from Allen (2003). The population figures are 
from Alvarez-Nogal and De La Escosura (2007) for 1530-1857 and Mitchell (2003) for 
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